DECLASSIFIED EXCISE E

SATURDAY
SEPTEMBER 4, 1954

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The indefatigable Hallstein arrived and we spent the morning together at my house. He said the Chancellor was gravely concerned over the rumor of my intention to leave Europe, and wished to write President Eisenhower on the subject. I asked this not be done -- I did not have to leave until December, and meanwhile we would see how things developed. I explained the nature of my present appointment as observer to the interim committee of EDC. Since this committee was at least moribund, I had no status to negotiate on matters of German sovereignty and rearmament, which should be dealt with through normal diplomatic channels.

Walter then asked for my personal and unofficial advice. Nothing is as painless to give, so I rambled on at considerable length.

I told him I wholly disapproved of the suggestion, under contemplation by the Chancellor, of sending him to Manila to see Foster. I thought there was no necessity for such a panicky flight, and, moreover, the request for the meeting, if made, would be rejected. I cautioned him again, as I have frequently done in the past, against the use of special envoys from Adenauer instead of the transaction of business through the regular diplomatic establishments.

Von Walther had told me of the informal approaches in regard to a possible early visit by Mendès to Adenauer. When Hallstein raised it, and expressed the belief the Chancellor might refuse such a conversation, I strongly argued for the adoption of a contrary decision. I thought there was no reason, in the absence of an official communication, to take cognizance of the matter, but if an official request was made Adenauer should accept. I felt he was fully capable of handling such a discussion, and his fears as to later distortions by Mendès of the interview could be guarded against by having interpreters and Hallstein himself present. The Chancellor distrusts Mendès, and has no confidence in his

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good intentions or his judgment, but, despite that, I pointed out the importance, indeed the necessity, of not affronting opinion, either in France or elsewhere, by what would be considered the discourteous refusal of one chief of state to receive the visit of another.

Hallstein said his Government was convinced there was nothing to be gained by quadripartite meetings (of the occupying powers with Fedrep) or even by the conference of eight nations, tentatively advanced by the British. The desire of the Chancellor was to know the policy of the U. S. Government regarding Germany. If he agreed with it, he thought the British would fall in accord. If they would not, he preferred as a long range objective a Treaty of Friendship between the U.S. and Fedrep, and an attendant understanding on German armaments so far as the two nations could bring about an effective arrangement in that field. He thought the American and German Governments should now quickly agree on the principles of a short-term program for the return of German sovereignty so it might be matured well before the emergency NATO Council meeting.

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The Germans see no present solution to the issue of their rearmament except the eventual revival of the EDC Treaty, or something like it. All solutions fall into two general categories. A. Complete freedom to Fedrep to have a national army and general staff, which would not be sanctioned by the French Parliament, nor perhaps by the British Parliament, and would be contrary to the Chancellor's own wishes. B. Discriminations against German forces. Adenauer would agree to certain self-imposed discriminations, but not, he thinks, enough to satisfy the French. Therefore, a "European" solution is the only politically practicable one.

Also, the Germans will not be content with the measure of sovereignty provided in the Bonn contractuals. They wish the restoration to be entire, except for the military clauses to be settled later. Since they believe the French will object to this, they would like the Americans and the British to act without the French in the event of the latter's refusal. If the U.K. jibs at this, then the U.S. and Fedrep should go it alone, with the moral backing of the other NATO countries.

We interchanged ideas in detail on many perplexing points, and found ourselves generally in accord. I expressed my view of the necessity of the Chancellor not making any statements that could be construed as attempting to isolate France. He agreed, and said the Chancellor had already decided not to do so. What had thus far been said in this connection, after the failure of EDC in the French Parliament, had been dictated by the political situation in Germany, which Adenauer again had under control, though one could not predict how long this would last. They believe it would be a waste of time for them to negotiate with the French on a bilateral basis, or to do so at all until they have reached an understanding with the Americans and British, or at least the Americans.

I had a hasty lunch with E. and Marie Louise Bousquet before we left for Orly, where we took a 3:15 plane for Barcelona. This three-hour flight seemed to pass

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more quickly than the hour-long proceedings in the Spanish customs and police headquarters of Barcelona. We were released just in time to board an Iberian Airlines craft for the fifty-minute journey to Palma. We reached there in the dark, but the sky was studded with stars and the air balmy.

We are staying about six kilometers from Palma in the Hotel Maricel, classified as a "luxury" hostel. It is crowded, which the proprietor says is its chronic state. We have a small double room with bath, and a terrace overlooking the water.

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